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In tandem with China?s rise, Chinese studies has gained popularity in research institutes around the 
globe since the early 1990s. Meanwhile, social constructivism has also made significant headway in the 
post-Cold War IR discipline. The development in these two academic areas bears implications beyond 
their own scholarly confines. Together, they pose a formidable challenge to the contemporary (social) 
sciences qua Western academic enterprise. A postmodern trend is clearly under the current, as both 
question the validity of ontological assumptions in rationalism. At the theoretical front on the one hand, 
constructivism does this by bringing key concepts, such as identity and interest, to the center stage of 
analysis. By introducing these concepts previously ignored by rational choice theorists, constructivists 
maintain that state behavior is essentially based on their perceived interest, which in turn is embedded in 
state identity (Wendt 1992). At the empirical level on the other hand, Chinese studies provide ample 
amount of case studies corroborating constructivist propositions. The purpose of this article is mainly to 
review some of these recent constructivist approaches in Chinese studies, following a brief account of the 
central tenets of the theory. Although still undervalued in Japan?s China studies, constructivism could 
add significant contributions to this field. This is particularly true granted the compatible nature between 
area studies and constructivism, with the former good at examining social phenomena from different an-
gles and the latter adaptive to new ideas from other disciplines.
Introduction
In tandem with China?s rise, Chinese studies has gained popularity in research institutes around the 
globe particularly since the early 1990s. Meanwhile, social constructivism has also made significant 
headway in the post-Cold War IR discipline. The development in these two academic areas bears im-
plications beyond their own scholarly confines. Together, they pose a formidable challenge to the con-
temporary (social) sciences qua Western academic enterprise. A postmodern trend is clearly under the 
current, as both question the validity of ontological assumptions in rationalism. At the theoretical 
front on the one hand, constructivism does this by bringing key concepts, such as identity and interest, 
to the center stage of analysis. By introducing these concepts previously ignored by rational choice the-
orists, constructivists maintain that state behavior is essentially based on their perceived interest, 
which in turn is embedded in state identity (Wendt 1992). At the empirical level on the other hand, 
Chinese studies provide ample amount of case studies corroborating constructivist propositions. The 
purpose of this article is mainly to review some of the recent constructivist approaches in Chinese 
studies, following a brief account of the central tenets of the theory.
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Constructivism
During most of the Cold War era, the International Relations (IR) discipline had largely been domi-
nated by materialism qua realism. Materialism emphasizes objectivity and materiality. Realism main-
tains that ?[t]he distribution of material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding 
world politics? (Mearsheimer 1995: 91). Based on this materialist assumption, state interest is taken for 
granted mostly as military power relative to other states (Krasner 1999). This assumption leads to a de-
terministic pattern of egoistic state behavior in the anarchy of world politics. Under anarchy, where no 
supranational organizations can authoritatively make arrangements in solving conflicts among sover-
eign states, countries are destined to take egoistic actions to advance their own interests even at the ex-
pense of others. When all states become egoistic, interstate conflicts are inevitable.
Constructivism, on the other hand, brings social relationality to the picture.1 Its main analytical pur-
poses include describing how actors (such as states) come to recognize their interests and identities 
(Finnemore 2003). In constructivism, thus, national interest and identity are not self evident, unlike in 
realism. They are instead socially constructed in the process of interactions among actors. Even under 
the same material condition such as anarchy, states do not always have to confront each other. Differ-
ent mechanisms of social interaction could construct different types of relationality such as communi-
ty (Adler and Barnett 1998) and hierarchy (Simpson 2004). The meaning and contents of national in-
terest and state identity could also differ according to each of such relationalities.2
Although realism and constructivism are often contrasted as competitive theories, they are not nec-
essarily contradictory. With different research questions in mind, the two theories often focus on dif-
ferent aspects of social realities (Hurd 2010: 311). Materialist emphasis often lies in how actors pursue 
interests, based on already established identities of the self and the other. In contrast, constructivists 
are mostly interested in identity construction during the process of interactions among actors (Ster-
ling-Folker 2000: 97). The following sections introduce how each constructivist concept, such as iden-
tity, norm, and socialization, are applied in recent Chinese studies.
Identity and Chinese Studies
What type of country is China? What does it want as it becomes increasingly powerful? These are 
questions and concerns with real policy implications for major powers in the region, the world hege-
mon? the U.S., and the future of world politics. At the same time, these questions also pertain the 
central concept of constructivism? identity. There have been different angles in studying the nature 
and shape of identity related to China. In addition to China?s self perceived identity (self identity), re-
searchers have also aimed to understand how China perceives other states (other identity), others per-
ceive China, and how China and other states (mis)understand each other.
 1 Although constructivism is sometimes confused with interpretivism, Howard maintains that it should rather be considered as 
a relational approach, and interpretivism a postmodernist one (Howard 2010: 403).
 2 Wendt identifies three types of relationality (referred as ?culture? in his word), each constitutes a particular set of state identity 
and interest. See Wendt (1999).
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China?s self perceived identity is a complex process, generated and transformed in multiple chan-
nels. Its antagonistic nationalism, according to Choi and Moon, is a product of the nation?s traumatic 
experience of colonial domination and subjugation (2010: 358). Others describe China?s intentional 
effort in creating a self identity so as to improve its status in the international hierarchy (Larson 2015).3 
Instead of directly challenging countries such as the U.S. for higher status, China seems to be willing to 
?forge a new identity and role consistent with its rising power.? Specifically, this effort includes Bei-
jing?s reorientation of identity as an economic production engine since Deng Xiaoping?s reform and 
opening-up policy, socialism with Chinese characteristics, responsible power, new security concept, 
harmonious world, and the newly launched institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) (Choi and Moon 2010: 345?347). In short, China has attempted to improve its status in 
the world by searching for a niche identity, without direct confrontation with the hegemon. If this is 
true, then, China?s rise does not pose much threat to the stability of the international society, contrary 
to what power transition theory predicts (Legro 2007; Tammen and Kugler 2006).
Shih (2012) applies a more nuanced analysis of China?s self identity based on the concepts of role 
states and ego states.4 He categorizes identity into intrinsic and extrinsic groups, which in turn give 
rise to two types of states. Mostly based on extrinsic identities, role states are the ones that care about 
how other states see them, therefore willing to conform to existing international norms.5 Since role 
states are anxious to fulfill their social expectations from other group members, they are more willing 
to adapt to existing norms, develop empathy and altruism (Branden 2001; Brewer 2004). Thus, role 
states are social participants, reproducing the structure where they belong (Turner 1962; Stryker 
2002). Ego states, in contrast, are more based on intrinsic identities to the effect of ?reforming or even 
defying existing international norms? (Shih 2012: 72). They lack intersubjective understanding of oth-
er members in the group (Serpe 1987: 46). Their priority is to maintain their freedom even at the ex-
pense of others. In the process of doing so, they could adopt strategies to act on, dominate or assimi-
late other states (Glass 1995).
Gries?s (2005) analysis of Chinese foreign policy at the turn of the century seems to corroborate 
Shih?s argument. In both the 1999 Belgrade Chinese embassy bombing and the 2001 EP3 aircraft colli-
sion incidents, Beijing negotiated just enough to save face. No specific demands for compensation of 
material and casualty damage were made from the Chinese side. Such self-constraint, according to 
Shih, reflects the country?s concerns for its own image in the international society.
Some Chinese IR scholars has attempted to bring the Chinese worldview to the discipline, building 
 3 According to social identity theory, social identity is derived from the perceived membership of the self in ?a social group to-
gether with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership? (Tajfel 1978: 63).
 4 Although both identity and role are pertinent concepts in constructivism, their conceptual differences are often ambiguous. I 
found the definition and distinction made by Chan (2014: 262) the most concise and accurate. ?[I]dentity is what constitutes 
the substance of being, whereas role refers to the kind of position one occupies in order to perform certain tasks. Identity is 
enduring, whereas role is more temporary?perception helps to define both identity and role.?
 5 As many other constructivists, Shih also anchors his analysis to social psychology and interactionism. Mead (1934), Goffman 
(1959), Turner (1956).
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Chinese theories based on Chinese philosophy and thinking. Qin is one such leading figures in this 
project. Juxtaposing the Hegelian tradition of dialectics with the Chinese relational philosophy, Qin ar-
gues that the former essentially assumes a homogeneous truth?the Western truth, toward which all 
the rest must eventually be incorporated. This homogenization drives conflict, excluding any possibili-
ty for states to share plural value systems, cultures and civilizations. This is an either-or logic.
In contrast, the Chinese relational thinking focuses on ?relations in process? and ?actors in process.? 
The assumption is that no individuals can exist without the other. Existence and transformation takes 
place in such interdependence and complementarity. ?One cannot exist without the other, because one 
creates conditions for the formation, existence, and transformation of the other? (Qin 2010: 138). Since 
relational thinking does not presuppose any eternal truth, any subject can change into something else. 
?A is A, but at the same time it is subject to change into non-A? (Qin 2010: 140). This is a both-and 
logic.
Applying the relational philosophy to international relations, Qin maintains that the international 
society is not an entity, but ?a process of complex, entangled, and ongoing relations? (Qin 2010: 141). 
Primary institutions and norms in the international society are also subject to change. Qin further 
points out that such relational philosophy explains why China did not engage in another cold war with 
the United States. Since under the both-and logic of relationality, countries do not have to eliminate 
other countries with different identities. Such ?inclusiveness? nurtures harmony (he) between states. In 
addition, changes in identity also makes it possible for countries to cooperate. The world has not wit-
nessed another cold war between China and the United States, because ?to a large extent, China 
changed and brought the change as well as itself into international society? (Qin 2010: 149).
In a similar vein of bringing Chinese ideas to the discipline to better understand how China sees the 
world, Pan and Lo (2017) provides a ?neo-tributary framework? to interpret China?s contemporary 
power strategy. They claim that the historical shapes the contemporary, and current IR theories de-
rived from Western experiences are not appropriate to explain Asian realities. Power, as a central tenet 
of IR, goes beyond the material, for it is also history-laden with ideas, norms and culture (Wendt 1999; 
Barnett and Duvall 2005). Against such theoretical backdrop, IR scholars have increasingly showed ac-
ademic interest in the tribute system and its application to the contemporary Chinese foreign policy 
(Zhang 2009). Specific issues and topics studied from this angle include China?s peaceful rise, develop-
ment, regional security, and alliance building (Cheow 2011; Forsby 2011; Kang 2010; Malik 2012).
The neo-tributary perspective, according to Pan and Lo, reveals that China has been pursuing its 
?lost prestige? in the international society. The country seeks for recognition in the international com-
munity, commensurate with its importance (The Los Angeles Times 2009). The regional economy has 
also shifted accordingly, with every regional player including the U.S. reorienting their positions 
around China (Lampton 2005: 310). Last but not least, cultural assimilation also takes place, as the 
Chinese Confucius Institutes spread across the world, sponsoring foreign students to study the Chi-
nese language and acknowledge China?s benevolence. Pan and Lo further claim that the neo-tributary 
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framework ?transcends western-dominated realist/liberal IR perspectives by considering historical 
Chinese experience and rethinking its modern relevance? (Pan and Lo 2017: 17).
Constructivist works go beyond China?s self perceived and self created identity to also shed light on 
how others perceive China. Social identity theory is again applied here. Wick (2014) finds that the 
American public is more concerned about China?s political culture than its military capabilities and 
Sino?American relationship. This implies that the American perception of China?s political culture 
could be a vital factor for the the U.S. attitudes toward China (Wick 2014: 302?306).
Research on mutual perception of identities between interacting actors points out the mechanism of 
misunderstanding and distrust between China and other countries. In his analysis of the Belgrade Chi-
nese Embassy bombing in 1999, Moore argues that poor handling of the incident by Washington and 
Beijing does not indicate a clash of national interests. Rather, the case escalated due to ?a number of 
perceptual gaps? between the two states. The Chinese firmly believe that the bombing was an inten-
tional attack to hurt China, while the Americans tend to take the event as an unfortunate incident. The 
same event was interpreted very differently, because for the Chinese, the American identity is essen-
tially a malign one. It is constructed in the history of interaction dating back to the Boxer Rebellion, 
Korean War, Taiwan controversy, and Tiananmen (Moore 2010: 23, 36). In any case, one important 
feature here is that identity is never a solipsistic product. Since constructivism is essentially a social 
theory, an actor?s identity is constructed only in relation to others.
In a similar vein, a ?new victim mentality? could be at work in China?s foreign policy making circle. 
Chinese scholars and decision makers purportedly share a common belief that the country faces a ma-
lign Western hegemonic discourse against itself. Zhao (2010: 301), for instance, argues that the West-
ern ignorance is even worse than malign intention against China, resulting in prejudices. Here, West-
ern media plays a major part in creating such misleading discourse (Hartig 2016: 662?664). According 
to Wasserstorm (2013: 122), such misunderstanding at least partially comes from the Chinese side. 
Chinese policy makers often fail to comprehend the different roles that media play in the West from 
those in their own country. While media usually serves as the fourth power in developed countries, it 
is mostly no more than a mouth piece of the Communist regime in China. As a result, the Chinese side 
at times perceives criticism by Western media as a political machination of their governments.
Existing IR literature in the West only seems to further corroborate the China threat theory. Power 
transition theory and offensive realism often portray a gloomy picture of a coming conflict between a 
rising China and the world hegemon ? the U.S. To make things even worse, China watchers in the 
U.S. are particularly susceptible to political influence, adding further complication to China related is-
sues (Jerden 2014: 81?85). Such concerns are not without grounds. As Bourdieu has correctly points 
out, knowledge creation carries tremendous political effects. Each IR theoretical approach, according-
ly, is a form of social fact, subject to political analysis (Bourdieu 1992: 235?241).
As China becomes increasingly aware of the importance of its identity as perceived by other states, it 
sets out to actively (re)create it through public diplomacy. As such, public diplomacy, as a new foreign 
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policy tool, resonates with the constructivist theory, for policy makers regard ?state identities as consti-
tuted through interaction and discourse? (Graham 2014: 527; also Cross 2013).6 Some China special-
ists argue that public diplomacy has drawn attention in China, because its traditional concept of ?face? 
makes the country particularly keen to maintaining a good image in the international society 
(d?Hooghe 2015). Also, Chinese think tank scholars argue that China needs to tone down its official 
voice and adapt its public diplomacy style to appeal to Western audience (Zhang 2012: 36; Wu 2012: 
35). Studies actually show that China has shown signs of change in this regard, as a ?result of learning 
and its image-building efforts? [emphasis added by author] (Zhang 2017: 9). Hartig concludes that Chi-
nese leaders, from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, also share a belief that public diplomacy is a strategic means 
to promote its culture in order to defend the country?s national interest against fierce international 
competition (2016: 670).
In addition to identities at the national level, constructivism also sheds light on those at subnational 
levels. Krolikowski points out that Chinese nationalism is a reflection of ?individuals? ontological inse-
curity and unhealthy basic trust.? The author goes beyond conventional argument that the Communist 
regime is simply manipulating nationalism to maintain its legitimacy and rule the society. From the 
point of view of grassroots nationalism, nationalism is a representation of individuals? need ?for a 
sense of existential security and a stable, anchored identity.? The Chinese government supports nation-
alism, not simply to serve political elites? narrow objectives. Rather, as a modern high state, Beijing re-
sponds to social needs of a population ?undergoing destabilizing domestic change and integration with 
the rest of the world? (Krolikowski 2008: 132).
Identity politics is one based on difference and distinction. As such, the differences between ethnic 
groups often comes to constructivist scrutiny. Baranovitch (2016) reveals how a minority ethnic group 
? Inner Mongolians ? strives to skillfully advance their ethnic identity agenda by linking it with en-
vironmental issues. Mongolian intellectuals have played a key role in ?ethnocizing? the environmental 
discourse, legitimizing otherwise illegal protests of Mongolian ethnic separatism. This was possible be-
cause Mongolian elites have intentionally adopted a strategy to appropriate ?the global environmental 
discourse to frame many of their ethno-nationalist aspirations and concerns within the legitimate 
framework of environmentalism? (Baranovitch 2016: 229).
Baranovitch?s methodology in discourse analysis is rather orthodox, examining ?the formation, con-
tent and expression of this discourse.? For the author, the elites forming such discourse, or the analyti-
cal object, include Mongolian artists, scholars, writers, officials, academics, and students. Through 
such discourse analysis, the author vividly points up the strong connection between Mongolian ethnic-
ity (struggle with the majority Han population and regime) and environmentalism (degradation of the 
 6 There are quite a few definitions of public diplomacy. According to Cull (2009), public diplomacy can be described as a coun-
try?s engagement and communication with foreign publics for the sake of communicating certain narratives and images of the 
country to promote its soft power and thereby national interests. The instruments to achieve those objectives include listening 
and advocacy, international broadcasting and international exchange, cultural diplomacy, and other aspects of strategic com-
munication such as media/psychological warfare.
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grassland). This connection enables them to frame their ethnicity ?in softer, environmental terms, 
while playing down the harder and more challenging components of their ethno-nationalist identity.? 
In short, the Mongolian elites ?enlist environmentalism as yet another tool to resist Han Chinese dom-
ination? (Baranovitch 2016: 216, 229).
Similarly focusing on a minority social group in China, Veg (2017) reveals a shift in Hongkongers? 
identity from nationals (guomin) to citizens (gongmin). While the former is embedded in ethnocultur-
al solidarity with China, the latter is based on universal values and a growing concern for human 
rights in mainland China. The shift, according to Veg, could be traced back to the 2009 vigil to com-
memorate the June Fourth Movement. The Movement was then also reinterpreted, reflecting Hong 
Kong citizens? ?political sense of a local community? (Veg 2017: 13). The Chinese state-led nationalism 
was now rejected, replaced by Hong Kong?s own community commemoration. Such shift to a new lo-
cal identity also vividly manifested in the discourse of the 2014 Umbrella Movement.
Ethnicity and locality are not the only dimensions for constructivist studies to decipher identity pol-
itics. One research focuses on professors? identities and the political discourse they engage. Hao and 
Guo (2016), invoking Evasdottir?s concept of ?obedient autonomy,? argue that Chinese intellectuals 
(professors) effect change ?by participation in the system, and not in its destruction.? New outlets of 
media, such as the internet, provides individuals with opportunities to make their voices heard (Hao 
and Guo 2016: 1045). Such voices, however, does not always have to mount to challenges against the 
Chinese Communist Party?s regime (Jiao ban ??). In most cases, professors would be satisfied if they 
can get students to think. In other words, professors do not have to agree with the ideology, even 
though they have to be in the system. Without openly challenging the ideology, each of them can still 
approach it with a professional attitude, practicing a form of obedient autonomy (Hao and Guo 2016: 
1052).
Chinese intellectuals are not the only one who plays identity politics. Traveskes argues that the Party 
still utilizes Maoist discourse to ?frame and justify the way the party-state punishes those it has identi-
fied as offenders in order to preserve political and social stability.? The Party has skillfully adapted 
criminal justice discourse to preserve social stability for the past 36 years. Regardless of the changes in 
issues and time, Maoist dialectics to treat the majority people with leniency but punish the minority 
criminals with severity has remained at the core of its criminal justice policy (2016: 299?303).
Identity studies also help us understand collective memories.7 Wemheuer (2010) documents a dis-
cursive division in China over the Great Leap Famine between the official and the nonofficial. The of-
ficial historiography of the Famine, found in intellectual accounts and government official narratives, 
does not acknowledge the tragedy and victimhood of local villagers. In contrast, local cadres and vil-
lagers share a different set of discourse about this period of suffering and starvation, because they had 
personally seen or experienced the Famine, identifying themselves as victims of the state. The author 
 7 For a detailed account of collective memory, see Halbwachs (1992).
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also points out a danger that although currently neither peasants nor local cadres are willing to openly 
challenge the official discourse, ?memories of the suffering in the past and anger about the present 
could become an explosive mixture? (Wemheuer 2010: 194).
Furthermore, identity studies shows that social divide in China is not limited to that between ethnic 
groups, urban and rural, but also exists in the virtual online world. Han?s work (2015) on the so-called 
?fifty-cent army? illustrates that online struggles are no longer binary between the state and regime 
challengers. Rather, Chinese netizens are fragmented, championing ?pluralized political values, ideas 
and norms? (Han 2015: 1007). Han draws a nuanced analysis, differentiating the ?fifty-cent army? from 
cyber nationalism and leftists. The ?fifty-cent army? mainains their group identity and discourse, by 
defending the Communist regime, claiming patriotism, and advancing their agenda through ?scientific 
rationality.?
Norms, Roles and Socialization
Norm, defined as shared understandings of standards for behavior, is another key concept in con-
structivist theory (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Katzenstein 1996; Klotz 1995: 17?27; Checkel 2001, 
2005; Johnston 2001, 2007). Usually, norms cannot be shared overnight. Rather, states negotiate and 
contend over norms. This process of negotiation and contention is referred as socialization. Seng de-
fines socialization as ?getting actors to adopt or conform to the rules and norms of a pre-existing insti-
tution or community over the long term and without resort to force or coercion? (Seng 2013: 5).
In his study of the socialization process between China and ASEAN, Han illustrates how both sides 
have attempted to shape the norm to its own advantage in the past several decades (Han 2017). The 
ASEAN norm, according to Ba (2006), did seem to affect China?s behavior in the region. Ba does not 
deny that there had been material and instrumental calculation at both sides at the initial stage to en-
gage each other. Significantly however, as time goes by such interaction based on engagement has 
changed China?s understanding of the relationship to be more amity than enmity (Ba 2006: 169).
This is what constructivists call ?social learning.? As a process of active persuasion, social learning 
eventually went beyond instrumental confines, continuously committing China to ASEAN norms of 
regional multilateralism, and non-coercive and open exchanges. Citing a number of Chinese regional 
policies after the 1990s when Beijing is no longer constrained by its policy choices to do so, Ba claims, 
?ASEAN?s engagement of China has been relatively successful.? Such policies include China?s initiative 
in creating the ASEAN China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 
and its ?new security concept?. These reassurance policies signifies a change in the part of China?s for-
eign policy orientation that goes beyond instrumental purposes (Ba 2006: 161?169).
Others study social learning at subnational levels. Zhai (2017), for instance, examines the spill-over 
effect of cultural exposure, based on the intergroup contact theory ? another social psychology link to 
constructivism. Intergroup contact theory has long held that ?equal status between the groups, com-
mon goals, cooperation, and institutional support? could contribute to conflict resolution and recon-
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ciliation among groups (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). More recent studies corroborate the 
theory, giving further credits to cultural exposure for its contributing effects to favorable intergroup 
relations as a result of cultivated empathy and reduced anxiety along the process (Ortiz and Harwood 
2007; Voci and Hewstone 2003). Such culture exposure could come in many forms, such as another 
country?s ?dramas, movies, and songs? (Zhai 2017: 98).
However, China specialists tend to be less optimistic about the socialization process. In his study 
about intergroup contact between the Japanese and the Chinese youth, Zhai (2017) finds that even 
when intergroup contact does improve mutual perception, it is often heavily influenced by other fac-
tors such as the degree of nationalism at both sides, the strength of a group identity (in this case, an 
Asian identity) and/or a cosmopolitan identity (Zhai 2017: 109, 110). In another study of China? 
ASEAN relations, He and Feng (2015) claims that just because China reoriented its behavior and 
assumed a role of norm-taker vis-a-vis ASEAN, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, does not 
necessarily mean that the country?s identity would also change accordingly. Indeed, this is what the authors 
call a ?superficial socialization.? Although Chinese leaders develop positive views about the ASEAN 
norm of multilateral cooperation, this has not fundamentally changed Beijing?s interests and identity 
(He and Feng 2015).
In addition, China has not been just a norm-taker. Since the late 2000s, Beijing has also sought to 
socialize ASEAN, bringing new norms to the region in solving territorial disputes and other issues 
(Han 2017: 2; He 2016: 205). This reflects the mutually constitutive nature of social interactions among 
agents. As Terhalle observes, ?rising powers are socialized into the order, while at the same time re-
shaping it when they enter? (Terhalle 2011: 345).
This means that norms are always subject to renegotiation and change. However, norm constructiv-
ism tends to emphasize how norms regenerate and sustain. Although Wendt does admit the possibili-
ties for norm change, his famous three cultures (read ?norm?) theory does not explain how norm 
change occurs (Wendt 1999). Relational constructivism, on the other hand, usually traces the changes 
in norms and agent (state) identities. In addition, the mechanism of norm sharing and change in one 
region cannot be simplistically applied to another. The Cold-War peace dividend that European coun-
tries enjoyed, for instance, cannot be naively expected in Asia or the rest of the world (Terhalle 2011: 
349).
Terhalle, however, does point out two ?tools? that could facilitate norm building for ?cooperative ac-
tivities? in the Asia-Pacific region. First, ?small informal groups? can help effectively deal with key is-
sues among states. Second, ?personalized interactions? serve as a communication channel between 
states to strengthen trust. These tools help states learn about each other?s views and interests, and 
make flexible adjustments and adaptations. In any case, the assumption is that the international society 
?lacks a common culture? (or norm) as Wendt envisioned, making it all the more important to heed at-
tention to ?pluralist principles of coexistence? (Terhalle 2011: 353?357).
In any given normative structure, agents assume their roles in socializing with others. International 
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institutions is one type of such structure where role based socialization takes place. Role theory proves 
to be a useful analytical tool in this regard. As a metaphorical concept borrowed from theater, role the-
ory as a research program sees the human society as ?a web composed of the roles of individuals? (He 
and Walker 2015: 373). What role China pursues depends on the country?s self-conception, other 
countries? expectation for it, and the ?role demands? of the international society. This claim clearly res-
onates with the constructivist propagation of interactions between agents (China and other countries) 
and structure (the international society).
Interests
Together with identity, norms and roles are significant because they fundamentally shape countries? 
(perceived) interests, which in turn bring behavioral and tangible differences. This is a major differ-
ence from materialist branches of IR, for it presupposes a volatile nature of national interest. As John-
ston notes, China?s interest in the non-proliferation issue has changed dramatically since the 1960s, 
when its leaders believed that a multipolar nuclear world was more desirable. Today however, both 
China and the United States share a common interest in denuclearization. Such interests become ?so 
deeply internalized as to be unquestioned? (Johnston 2011: 13, 14).
Constructivist analysis of interests is not limited to those at the state level. Indeed, any agents can 
come under scrutiny of the theory for that matter. Kristensen and Nielsen (2013) provides a unique ac-
count for Chinese scholars? interest in constructing Chinese IRT. Here, theoretical innovation is an en-
terprise for scholars to pursue academic prominence and draw attention from their peers. Drawing 
concepts from sociology of knowledge (Collins 1998), the authors argue that the drive for carving out 
new scholarly positions are not so much born out of the larger backdrop of China?s rise, as a more im-
mediate social context of academic scene.
In order to receive attention, scholars cultivate difference and uniqueness. They engage in rivalry 
and debate turning academic networks to ?attention space.? The authors further point out that such ri-
valry bears down-to-earth implications. ?[I]ntellectuals, like other human beings, have to make living 
and a career.? They do so in academic institutions, such as universities. Chinese scholars are no excep-
tion here. Their endeavors to construct a Chinese IR theory have been an ongoing process for over two 
decades now. Their behavior confirms the law of small numbers, in which the strategic choice is to 
present distinctive ideas in relation to ongoing debate. Even established scholars, such as Qin Yaqing 
and Yan Xuetong, are not exempted from such pressure. They tend to utilize Chinese ancient materi-
als, precisely because such approach allows them to ?maximize their distinctiveness internationally? 
(Kristensen and Nielsen 2013: 19?28).
The English School proves to be particularly encouraging for Chinese scholars. It is well-taken in the 
Chinese academia, because it represents a challenge against the dominant American scientism (Qin 
2009: 191; Wang 2009: 109). Chinese IR scholars cannot help but wonder, ?if there is an English school, 
why can?t there also be a Chinese school?? (Ren 2008: 297). Indigenous uniqueness thus allows Chi-
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nese scholars to ?carve out an international niche for a certain geographical perspective? (Kristensen 
2015: 180).
Competition and integration with other IR theories
A novel theory as in any scientific disciplines, constructivism must find its scholarly niche and prove 
itself to be more than just equally persuasive than existing literature. Since realism has been the domi-
nant theory there before constructivist ascendence, in most cases particularly during the first decade 
of the new century, the theory often finds itself forced to pit against this formidable rival. Donaldson 
and Donaldson for instance, claim that structural realism cannot provide consistent explanation for 
the rationale behind Sino?Russo arms trade pattern. The authors conclude that structural variable 
(Russia?s relative decline) does not account for Russia?s behavior as much as identity issues in this case 
(2003: 727). They point out that the alliance is weak and neither country believes that the counterpart 
is committed to balance against the U.S. This is even more so as both Beijing and Moscow have at-
tempted to ?reach out to? the U.S. even when they were trying to improve ties with each other.
Yet, constructivists do not only engage in competition with other theorists. In recent decade, they 
actively seek for common grounds with other IR approaches. Acharya, one of the most well-known 
constructivists, for example, argues that Asian security order can be analyzed from a consociational 
perspective. Consociational Security Order (SCO) ?a relationship of mutual accommodation among 
unequal and culturally diverse groups that preserves each group?s relative autonomy and prevents the 
hegemony of any particular groups? (Acharya 2014: 159). Although wars are not unthinkable as in a 
security community, states restrain themselves out of a strong desire to avoid system collapse. Interna-
tional institutions are more likely to be intergovernmental, managed by sovereign states rather than su-
pranational ones. In other words, interdependence and coordination among states does not lead to in-
tegration (Acharya 2014: 159?171). Here, constructivism comes close to liberalism and liberal 
institutionalism.8
China Japan Relations
Regardless of the booming heat in both constructivism and Chinese studies around the world, Japa-
nese researchers of Chinese studies rarely adopt this approach.9 A limited number of analysis of Sino?
Japanese relations from a constructivist angle are often done by non-Japanese researchers. In such cas-
es, the focus is often the theory than the empirical. In other words, Sino?Japanese relations are merely 
raw materials for constructivist theorists to corroborate their claims. Chinese researchers, in contrast, 
seem to be more willing to utilize the theory. Xu and Pu, for instance, convincingly build an account 
for the relationship between the Chinese war reparation movement and Beijing?s official discourse. 
 8 As Acharya points out, consociationalism is derived from domestic politics. Some of the classical works he cites include, Bo-
gaards (1998), Cannon (1982), and Lijphart (1962). 
 9 Recently though, there are signs of change in some of the well-known area studies journals. Zhai (2017) as mentioned earlier 
is one such example.
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They claim that (both local and the central) Chinese governments? intervention (either in the form of 
facilitation or repression) would negatively impact the development of citizen participation in and the 
development of the movement (Xu and Pu 2010).
Also appearing in a recent issue of The Pacific Review, Nakano (2016) attempts to decipher the 
mechanism of the recent escalation of territorial disputes between China and Japan around 2012. She 
maintains that what at stake there is not just a power-political conflict (Forsberg 1996), but ?a confron-
tation of national identity and world vision associated with borders and history? (2016: 178). The cur-
rent maritime border with Japan represents a history of unjust humiliation, imposed upon China 
when it was backward and weak. For Japan though, the same border ?showcases Japan?s contribution 
to regional peace and stability, and as the status quo borders are normal and just, it is necessary for Ja-
pan as a sovereign state to protect this status quo.? In short, as Nakano summarizes, ?[m]utual suspi-
cion between China and Japan are interwoven with a divergent understanding of each other?s collec-
tive memory and national identity? (Nakano 2016: 178, 179).
Conclusion
China?s rise during the past several decades has no doubt triggered alert if not antagonism from Ja-
pan. Realist theory has predicted an ominous conflict ahead of the two neighboring states. Although 
constructivism tends to picture a future of path dependence, Sino?Japanese relations do not bode bet-
ter than what realism forecasts. However, the shifting balance of power between the two countries 
does not necessarily lead to a future of confrontation and bloodshed. Neither does the history of war 
between the two nations have to predestine the future of the two peoples. Professor Amako emphasiz-
es that Japan and China are like two neighbors who cannot move to elsewhere. The two peoples must 
find a way to coexist. They may not have to love each other to maintain peace, but they do have to bet-
ter understand each other for that purpose.
Indeed, constructivism offers a particularly precious angle for historians, political scientists and IR 
researchers to make better sense of the other side. Drastically departing from the Cartesian tradition, 
constructivism assumes that the human world is essentially different from the natural world in that it 
does not follow any universal law. Key concepts in the theory, such as identity and norm, are only so-
cially constructed meanings, constantly subject to renegotiation and change. It is perhaps not a coinci-
dence that constructivism quickly surfaced in the IR academia after the end of the Cold War, as the 
world became increasingly diversified. Incorporating ideas from other disciplines, such as sociology 
and psychology, constructivism seized this opportune timing.
This is also a point where area studies are good at. Flexibly incorporating all concepts and ideas 
from different disciplines, area studies is a down-to-earth scholarly enterprise that does not content it-
self with numerical games and parsimonious models. Rather, its primary aim is always to grasp the re-
ality of the human world. Yet, constructivism application to China studies in Japan has kicked in slow. 
Most of the constructivism works by Japanese scholars focus on European cases (Oyane 2013). Wheth-
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er the theory proves to be a useful tool in this regard, however, is entirely path dependent. As Professor 
Amako always emphasizes, it doesn?t matter what ism you argue, you just have to explain the reality 
well.
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